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China’s growth has been rapid but the value of China's international trade has grown even faster. 
This trade-biased growth is bringing both challenges and opportunities for Asian economies that are 
highly integrated with Chinese trade networks. Moreover in ASEAN countries such as Indonesia 
and Malaysia, China’s success has been seen as a threat to its existing trade and manufacturing base. 
We use an historical simulation analysis to examine the impacts of China’s growth on Asian 
economies. We find that a decade of China’s growth has raised GDP per capita in the developed 
Asian economies by around 16%. The effect on the ASEAN-4 economies is not as strong but still 
large, the GDP of the ASEAN-4 economies increased by approximately 7%. The main source of 
these gains is found to be lower durable goods import costs which induce accumulation of 
machinery and equipment capital. 
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1.  Introduction 
In thinking about the impacts of China’s growth on the world economy, two facts stand out. First, 
China’s growth is an exceptionally high rate of growth – on par with the highest growth rates 
attained by Japan in the 1960s and the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong in the 1970s. Second, China’s growth has been extremely 
biased. Though GDP has increased by around 100% between 1995 and 2005, China's international 
trade flows have far outstripped its GDP growth. Over the same period for example exports relative 
to GDP grew by 62 percent (World Bank 2010).
 1 
But these two facts, China’s high rate of GDP growth and even faster export growth, are not 
necessarily sufficient to guarantee that China is having a dramatic impact on the global economy. 
Standard trade models suggest that this depends on a countries ability to affect world prices which in 
turn depends upon the bias in the pattern of growth and how this affects world relative supplies.
2 
They also suggest that the effects of China’s growth on other countries may be positive or negative 
depending on the similarity of their trade patterns. Thus there is considerable concern among the 
developing Asian economies, such as the ASEAN group, that China’s growth is having a 
detrimental effect on their terms of trade (Coxhead 2007).  
There is, however, very little analytical work that attempts to relate China’s growth to its trade flows 
and to the economic impacts on China’s trading partners. Much of the work that does exist moreover 
is based on gravity models. These look at the effects of one countries trade flows on another 
countries trade flows, but do not tell us how this impacts on important economic outcomes such as 
wages, incomes and inequality. 
The aim of this paper therefore is to undertake a quantitative assessment of the broad stylized facts 
regarding China's growth and trade bias focusing in particular on their impacts on the developed 
Asian economies of Japan and the NIEs, and the ASEAN-4 economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Philippines.  
To do this we use a calibrated open economy growth model of the Chinese and the regional Asian 
                                                 
1 See Amiti and Freund (2008) for a recent discussion of China’s export growth and characteristics. 
2For example, in the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, growth in one country will have no impact on the rest of the world, 
irrespective of how large the country is or how fast the growth rate is, unless it is biased towards one sector.   2
economies. The model incorporates inter-temporal optimization with respect to physical and human 
capital accumulation, and consumption decisions. It also incorporates multiple traded and non-
traded sectors. This multi-sector approach is crucial as the effects of China’s growth on other 
countries will be mediated through changes in trade – specifically the terms of trade. These trade-
growth linkages that we wish to explore can only be analysed in a multi-sector model.  
We limit our attention to comparative steady state analysis of the long run effects of China’s growth. 
The model is solved with exogenous productivity parameters, including traded sector specific 
productivity growth, in order to reproduce the stylized facts of China's growth and trade bias. 
Specifically, the exogenous productivity growth has the interpretation of sector specific falling trade 
costs. This solution is compared with a counterfactual benchmark where China’s per capita growth 
is only growing at the world average of around 2% per year.  
The simulations show that trade biased growth has a large impact on both the developed Asian and 
ASEAN-4 economies. A decade of China’s growth is found to have increased GDP per capita in the 
developed Asian economies by about 17%. The impact on the ASEAN-4 economies is also large at 
7%. Both values represent a significant contribution to regional growth. The contribution of China’s 
growth to Japan and the NIEs is truly remarkable, being equivalent to 1.5 percentage points of 
growth per year over a decade. 
The remainder paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes some stylized facts regarding 
China's growth patterns and its integration with the Asian region. Section 3 describes the model 
structure. Section 4 discusses the experiment designs and the results are reported in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings. 
2.  China’s Growth and Integration with Asia 
2.1 Growth in China 
The structure of China’s economy has changed profoundly since the implementation of a 
comprehensive set of economic reforms to liberalise and open its economy to foreign trade in 1978. 
It has shifted from an agriculture based economy to an economy with a massive industrial sector and 
a large services sector. According to Bosworth and Collins (2008), over the period 1979 to 1995, 
China grew at 6.4% per year but in the decade 1995 to 2005 the growth rate accelerated to 8.9% per 
year. China is now the world’s third largest economy when its output is measured at the market   3
exchange rates and accounts for over 7% of the global trade flows.  
Though it is widely believed that growth in China will have large economic impacts on its trading 
partners, trade theory tells us that the impacts are ambiguous and may be completely neutral. 
Specifically, in a Heckscher-Ohlin model, growth that increases the output of all sectors at the same 
rate, will have no impact on the terms of trade, and hence no impact on other countries.  
It is important therefore that, as noted above, China’s export sector grew much faster than GDP with 
the exports to GDP ratio rising by 59% over the decade 1995 to 2005 (Harris et al. 2010). Moreover, 
the composition of China’s exports has diversified away from light manufacturing commodities 
towards capital- and skill-intensive products. The exports of China were mainly concentrated on 
labour intensive products in the early 1990s but since then a growing proportion of exports has 
become more capital- and skill-intensive. This is shown in Table 1 which reports the changes in 
China’s export bundle over time. It shows that, between 1990 and 2005, the share of durables goods 
more than doubled whereas the shares of all other sectors declined. As emphasized by Schott (2006), 
Rodrik (2006), and Amiti and Freund (2008), China's export bundle has become increasingly 
sophisticated.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Part of this expansion for both the changing level and pattern of trade is likely to be due to falling 
trade barriers. Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) report that the average (unweighted) tariff rates in 
China fell from 55.6% in 1982 to 12.3% in 2002. At the same time, the Chinese government has 
also reduced the non-tariff barriers and introduced special privileges for export processing firms 
including all foreign owned and jointly owned firms.  
Nevertheless, the exceptionally strong growth in the durables sector points to some form of sector 
specific, or export specific, technological change. Indeed, there is some evidence that productivity 
growth has been higher in the export sectors (Perkins 1997; Amighini 2005). One possible source of 
this is the falling trade costs and the rise of global fragmentation of the production process which 
has been pronounced in the Asian region (Athukorala 2009; Branstetter and Lardy 2006). 
Unfortunately, as noted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), the evidence on how trade costs 
have fallen over time and the relationship to global fragmentation is very limited. According to 
Branstetter and Lardy (2006) and Lardy (2003), foreign investment has been largest in the durable 
goods sector, suggesting that international technology spillovers have been important.    4
2.2 Regional Integration  
The impacts of China’s growth on other countries depend on the strength of their international trade 
linkages. Since we are concerned with historical Chinese growth between 1995 and 2005, the 
relevant measures of integration are those that existed at the start of this period in 1995. Table 2 
provides a summary of the level of integration between China and its Asian neighbours as it existed 
then. Columns 1 and 2 report the shares of China destined exports from the two Asian regions. 
Exports to China accounted for 10.6% of all exports from Japan and the NIEs (including intra-
regional trade). Exports to China accounted for 3.5% of ASEAN-4’s exports. Thus, the former 
region is much more integrated with China in terms of its export markets. ASEAN-4’s main export 
to China is low-tech manufacturing goods whereas for the developed Asian region, durable goods 
sector is the main export category.  
Table 2 also shows China’s export patterns (Columns 3 to 6). As destination countries, Japan and 
the NIEs accounted for 31.0% of China’s exports. Around one-third of this is low-tech 
manufacturing goods. ASEAN-4 accounted for a much smaller fraction of China’s exports. Columns 
5 and 6 report the same Chinese export values, but this time expressed as a fraction of world exports 
to each region. Thus, they correspond approximately to the Chinese sourced import shares for 
developed Asian and ASEAN-4 economies.  It can be seen that for example 8.4% of world exports 
to developed Asia are from China whereas only 3.9% of world exports to the ASEAN-4 economies 
are from China. Thus, circa 1995, Japan and the NIEs were much more integrated with the Chinese 
economy than the ASEAN-4 economies.  
[Tables 2 & 3 about here] 
The trade structure of China and the ASEAN-4 economies are similar. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of exports by commodity sectors for China, developed Asia and the ASEAN-4 
economies. The composition of exports for the developed Asian region have remained relatively 
unchanged during 1990 to 2005, exports were dominated by the durables sector. Both China and the 
ASEAN-4 economies observed a decline in the importance of the low-tech manufacturing sector in 
exports while that of the durables sector increased between 1990 and 2005.  
2.3 Policy Debates 
China’s rapid growth has given rise to concern among the Asian economies that China has been   5
crowding out their manufacturing export industries (Lall and Albaladejo 2004; Eichengreen et al. 
2007). China’s export share for the US market, for example, increased from 3.1% in 1990 to 15.0% 
in 2005, whereas the market shares of Japan and the NIEs have fallen. The concern over world trade 
and investment shares seems to be particularly acute for Asian economies that have lower income 
levels and a trade structures that are less complementary to that of China (Weiss and Gao 2003; Chia 
2006; Ravenhill 2006; Coxhead 2007).  
Lall and Albaladejo (2004) attempt to classify the exports of China’s neighbours into five levels of 
“threat”.
3 According to their definition, most of the exports of the NIEs and the ASEAN-4 
economies are under some form of threat from China’s exports. A more sophisticated approach is to 
employ the gravity model to measure the partial effect of China’s exports on other countries export 
patterns. Ahearne et al. (2003), Eichengreen et al. (2007), Greenaway et al (2008) and Athukorala 
(2009) examine the effects of China’s export growth on the exports of other Asian countries using 
this approach. Ahearne et al. (2003) find no significant effects but Eichengreen et al. (2007) and 
Greenaway et al (2008) find that China’s exports tend to “crowd out” the exports of Asian 
neighbours in third country markets. The crowding out is felt more strongly in the developing Asian 
economies than in the industrialised Asian economies. Eichengreen et al. (2007) also find that 
China’s growth has a positive effect on the exports high income Asian economies, that are 
significant exporters of capital goods, and a strong negative effect on low income Asian countries 
that are dependent on the production and exports of consumer goods. A more recent study by 
Athukorala (2010), however, finds little evidence to indicate that increases in China’s exports reduce 
the market shares of other Asian economies in third country markets. To the contrary, he finds that 
China’s exports to third country markets have had complimentary effects on Asian exports. 
These mixed results are also reflected in simulation studies that have looked at the effects of China’s 
WTO accession on other regional Asian economies, for example Ianchovichina and Walmsley 
(2005) and Roland-Holst and Weiss (2005). There is some evidence from these studies that 
developed Asian countries stood to gain from China’s WTO accession with an expansion in their 
trade and an improvement in their terms of trade. But developing countries with an endowment 
structure similar to China, such as Southeast Asia, face keener competition in their exports and 
lower prices for their products. Roland-Holst and Weiss (2005), however, dismiss the apprehension 
                                                 
3 For example, Lall and Albaladejo (2004) define “threat” as being if China gains export market share and the other 
countries lose, and “no threat” is where both China and the other economy gain market share, but with China growing 
more slowly.   6
of China’s growing world trade shares arguing that there is no convincing evidence that China’s 
trading partners are losing comparative advantage in higher value added or more skill-intensive 
activities.  
As yet, there has been no analysis of the long run effects of China’s growth per se. China’s 
accession to the WTO, for example, is only a very small part of China’s overall reform process. 
Moreover, the changes in trade patterns and increased trade flows arising from China’s growth 
miracle, vastly exceed the changes implied by trade reforms alone. Though the gravity model   
literature recognises the impact of changes in countries GDP on trade flows, these studies only 
explain trade flows and fall short of telling us how changes in China’s growth affect incomes, 
consumption and wages in other countries. The weak theoretical foundations of these models mean 
that that it is difficult to make any inferences regarding economic policy responses from these 
results. 
3. The Model 
The aim is to use a simulation model to undertake controlled experiments of the effects of China’s 
growth on other Asian economies. To allow for trade-growth interactions we introduce long run 
neoclassical steady state factor accumulation conditions into an open economy growth model. The 
model includes eleven sectors (six traded and five non-traded) and three separate regions. The focus 
of the model is to see how commodity price changes can affect factor prices - the Stolper-Sameulson 
effects - and how these in turn affect physical and human capital accumulation decisions in each 
region. Both regions are modeled as small open economies with respect to the Rest of the World 
(ROW), but not with respect to each other. Growth in China, for example, will have an impact on 
prices in the developed Asian and ASEAN-4 economies and this in turn will induce growth effects 
through capital accumulation as well as gains in consumption through terms of trade improvements.  
3.1 Structure of the Model 
We consider a model with three regions, China, Asia and the ROW. In one application, Asia will be 
an aggregate of Japan and the NIEs. In a second application, Asia will be the ASEAN economies of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines. We employ a small open economy framework with 
respect to the two regions of interest, China and Asia. Thus we assume that these regions face a 
constant world price for goods exported to the ROW. However, China and Asia are not assumed to 
be small with respect to each other. Domestic prices in China and Asia are determined by domestic   7
demand and export supplies from each region. 
To allow for trade, and specifically terms of trade, effects our growth model is disaggregated both at 
the sectoral level and at the factor input level. The model combines standard growth and trade 
theory, and contains eleven goods, and seven factors of production. Six of the eleven goods are 
traded. In what follows we give a brief overview of the main features of the model.
4  
3.2 Trade  
Within each region we want to keep the motivation for trade close to standard trade theory. Thus, we 
retain the traditional “Heckscher-Ohlin” assumption that goods are homogenous within each region. 
Trade is not motivated by the “Armington” differentiated goods model.
5 Rather we assume that 
firms are joint producers producing three goods, each distinguished by its market destination. Let R  
denote the set of regions in the model. Then each firm is assumed to face a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) unit revenue function, which depends on the prices the producer receives for 
its commodities sold in each market. The CET revenue function is  
   R j R r p
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4 A more detailed description of the model is available upon request. 
5 The “Armington assumption” is that imported and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes. This assumption is 
common in much of the computable general equilibrium model literature.    8
3.3 Investment in Physical and Human Capital 
The investment demands for each type of physical capital, and skilled labour are derived from 
perfect foresight present value maximisation problems. Let 
r
k u  refer to the after factor tax rentals on 
physical capital  } , , { D S M k    in region r .  Hence, (1 )
rr r
kk k uw   , where 
r
k   is the tax rate on each 
factor k, in region r. Then for each capital good, machinery and equipment, M, structures, S, and 
residential housing, D, households in each non-ROW region choose a sequence of gross investment 
spending to maximize the discounted flow of net rentals.  
This yields 3 x 2 “Tobin-Q” investment demand equations and 3 x 2 inter-temporal arbitrage 
conditions for each asset price,  ,
r
kt  . On a steady state, the investment rate will be  k k k V Q     / . 
In this case investment demand equations yield a simple relationship between the investment price 
index and the rental rate, where 
rr
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 A similar investment demand equation drives the accumulation of skilled labour. At a point in time 
the labour force consists of skilled labour, t LS , unskilled labour,  t LU , and stock of students,  t H . 
We define a skilled worker as a worker who possesses a tertiary degree or comparable post-
secondary qualification. The education sector transforms unskilled workers into skilled workers. 
Thus, there is an endogenous flow of students graduating and entering the skilled labour force each 
year. On a steady state   b LS H  / , where b is the birth rate and  is the number of years of 
education, and inter-temporal arbitrage requires that the skill premium is related to the interest rate 
and the cost of education. 
4.  Policy Simulations  
We begin by constructing a benchmark equilibrium. This is calibrated to steady state growth path 
where all variables are growing proportionally, prices and factor returns and the debt to GDP ratio 
are constant, and there is balanced trade. The principal data sources are Dimaranan (2006), Barro 
and Lee (2001), Heston et al. (2006), and Brown and Stern (2001). We then solve the model with 
endogenously chosen technology parameters so that the stylized facts are reproduced exactly by the 
model solution. Thus we first ask, what must be assumed about neutral technical change; trade   9
sector biased technical change, and reduction in trade barriers - to reproduce different aspects of 
China's growth experience. 
4.1 Growth Targets 
Bosworth and Collins’ (2008) measure of growth of 8.9% implies a 2.15 fold increase in China’s 
GDP per capita over a decade. The underlying assumed world trend rate of growth, of just under 2% 
per year, leaves an additional growth premium for China of 6.8% per year, or equivalently, a 80.8% 
increase in GDP per capita, above the trend rate over 10 years. In the simulations below, we use this 
figure as a target for the aggregate growth of the Chinese economy. Likewise from 1995 to 2005 
China’s export to GDP ratio increased from approximately 22% to 35% of GDP, which represents a 
target increase of 59%. 
We employ combinations of changing trade cost parameters and falling tariff rates that achieve the 
export growth targets observed in the data.  In the benchmark, we normalize the revenue function 
parameters, or “iceberg costs”,  j i,  , to unity. A fall in trade costs associated with China's export 
growth means that  j i,   >1 for i = China and j = the other two regions. 
Given these productivity parameters, we proceed as follows. Simulation 1, s1, examines the effects 
of a pure labour augmenting increase in productivity, that is a uniform increase in the effective 
labour supply parameters on skilled and unskilled labour, across all sectors, i=1-11. In the second 
simulation, s2, we add to this a fall in Chinese export trade costs across all tradable sectors so that (i) 
the export value share in each sector reaches the 2005 share value, as given in Table 2, and (ii) the 
export to GDP ratio increases to its 59% target. In the third simulation, s3, the targets remain the 
same but we also include the tariff reductions.  
5.  The Impact of China’s Trade Biased Growth 
5.1  Steady-State Solutions for China 
Table 4 reports the steady state solutions to the simulations for China. The results shown are for the 
version of the model where China and developed Asia are the regions.
6 Column 1 shows the neutral, 
or “unbiased growth” scenario. In this case China’s growth is assumed to be driven by labour 
                                                 
6 The results for China when ASEAN is the other region are almost identical and therefore not reported here, but are 
available upon request.   10
augmenting productivity which applies equally across all sectors, and across domestic and export 
markets. The values of skilled labour productivity, S A  and unskilled labour productivity, U A , are 
chosen so that GDP increases by 80.8%. It can be seen that the target increase in GDP requires a 
102% increase in the labour productivity parameters,  S A  and  U A . The target growth rate is achieved 
through this productivity change and endogenous accumulation of the capital stocks and a more 
modest 25% increase in skilled labour. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In this scenario, however, it can be seen that exports relative to GDP fall rather than increase. This 
counterfactual result clearly indicates that the Chinese growth experience cannot be explained by a 
neutral growth process as it would imply that China, through domestic expansion was becoming 
more closed. Likewise the pattern of trade is highly counterfactual under unbiased growth 
assumption with too much expansion of low-tech manufacturing exports and insufficient growth of 
durables exports, which should have a share of 50.7% rather than the 37.7% reported.  
Column 2 shows the results for China of simulation s2, which examines the effects of export sector 
biased growth. This bias could be due either to falling trade costs or productivity spill-over due to 
heavier FDI in the export sectors. In this scenario the trade cost parameters for China's exports,  j i,   
adjust to the sector specific targets and the overall export to GDP ratio target of 59.1%. It can be 
seen that this requires a 42% fall in “trade costs” on average across each sector as indicated by the 
73% increase in 
rj
i  . The required aggregate labour augmenting productivity in this case is just 30%. 
Thus, the trade sector biased growth accounts for the bulk of China's productivity growth. 
Simulation s3 allows for the observed pattern of tariff reforms. The economy-wide results in this 
case are very similar, though there are some important differences at the sectoral level particularly 
for agriculture. Note also that in both s2 and s3, there is quite substantial deterioration in China’s 
terms of trade. 
5.2 Results of China’s Expansion on Japan and the NIEs 
We now turn to the main results of interest which are the effects of China’s growth on the other 
Asian economies. The results for developed Asia are reported in Tables 5 and 6, and the results for 
ASEAN-4 are reported in Tables 7 and 8. As shown in Table 5, under the assumption of unbiased 
productivity growth in China, s1, there is only a small impact on the developed Asian economies   11
with GDP per capita increasing by just 1.6%. Allowing for biased trade patterns in s2, however, 
generates a massive 16.2% improvement in GDP per capita in developed Asia, and a similar 13% 
increase in consumption per worker. 
[Tables 5 & 6 about here]  
This translates to a growth elasticity of approximately 0.25. That is for every additional percentage 
point of biased growth in China, developed Asia gains approximately 0.25 percentage points of 
annual growth. This emphasises the importance of the pattern of bias in Chinese growth process. 
Neutral growth in China would have little impact on it trading partners. The gains are similar once 
China’s tariff reductions are included (s3), though not quite as large with a 12.6% increase in GDP 
and an 11% increase in consumption.  
The sources of this growth are the terms of trade improvement of 7.5%, and the induced effects of 
factor accumulation. In particular there is a 29% increase in both machinery and equipment, and 
structural capital. The gains in developed Asia are driven primarily by the lower cost of capital, 
generating increased capital deepening via the steady state asset pricing equation  (2). China’s 
growth also causes developed Asia to become more open with the export to GDP ratio increasing by 
8%.
7  
Crowding out effects are, however, notable at the sectoral level. China’s growth implies a large fall 
in developed Asia’s durables sector. More detailed results on the pattern of trade are shown in Table 
6. Rising openness is driven by increasing trade with China at the expense of the ROW. Under the 
biased growth scenario, s2, China’s share rises from 13% of developed Asia’s export market in the 
base, to over 50.7% of developed Asia’s export market. Particularly notable is the expansion of 
intermediate (components) and low-tech manufactured goods exports to China.  
5.3 Results of China’s Expansion on ASEAN-4 
Next we consider the results for the ASEAN-4 economies in Tables 7 and 8. It can be seen that the 
effects on per capita incomes in the ASEAN-4 economies are much more modest, at 7.7% in s2 and 
7.3% in s3, this primarily reflects ASEAN-4’s lower level of integration with China in terms of 
ASEAN-4’s import shares from China. Interestingly, China’s growth does cause the ASEAN-4 
countries to become more closed, relatively speaking, with trade to GDP ratio declining.  Hence 
                                                 
7 Since trade is balanced in equilibrium this also implies an identical increase to import—GDP ratio for the USA.   12
trade flows, though growing, do not grow quite as fast in ASEAN-4 as the non-traded sector. Real 
consumption increases are 6.3 to 6.7%, and real wages rise by around 4 to 5% in each of the trade 
biased simulations, with little change in the ratio of skilled to less skilled worker wage incomes. 
Most of the growth effects come from increased rate of capital accumulation due to falling prices of 
capital inputs, particularly for machinery and equipment.  
[Tables 7 & 8 about here] 
Table 8 shows that China becomes a much more important export destination for ASEAN-4, as a 
result of China’s growth. China’s share of ASEAN-4’s exports rises from 3.7% in the base case, to 
around 20% of ASEAN-4’s exports in s2 and s3.  By far the largest growth on a sector basis occurs 
in the low-tech manufacturing sector. As a whole this sector expands by 35 to 36% in s2 and s3.  
Conversely there is a dramatic decline in the ASEAN-4’s durables sector. Table 7 shows that there 
is a decline in durables output of 36%. As shown in Table 8, the durables sector’s share of exports to 
the ROW declines from 39.9% of all exports in the base, to approximately 23% of exports in s2 and 
s3. This crowding out of the durables sector is induced by China’s exports to ASEAN-4 which 
drives down domestic durables prices. Despite this, however, it can be seen that the durables sector’s 
export shares to China increase from 0.7 to 1.7% of exports. Indeed there is an increase in exports to 
China across all sectors, but particularly in agriculture and low-tech manufacturing. China’s share of 
ASEAN-4’s export market increases from 3.7 to 20%, which in proportional terms is a much larger 
change than was found for the developed Asian economies. 
 Thus China’s growth, in these experiments indeed is shown to cause a sharp change in ASEAN-4 
countries’ trade patterns, crowding out the higher end sectors such as durables and causing ASEAN-
4’s production patterns towards greater specialisation in agriculture and low tech sectors. However, 
we also found substantial growth benefits, rising wages and no significant impact on skill 
accumulation for the ASEAN-4 economies. 
6.  Conclusion 
The principal conclusion from these simulations is that the impact of China’s growth on its Asian 
neighbours has not only been positive, but also very substantial. This is particularly so for the more 
industrialised Asian economies of Japan and the NIEs. As a group, a decade of China’s growth is 
shown to generate a 16% increase in GDP with similar gains in consumption. The gains to Japan   13
and the NIEs concord with the general conclusions from the WTO accession literature, and also with 
the gravity model literature. Our results emphasis the substantial magnitude of income gains from 
China’s growth on this region and also the mechanism by which these income and consumption 
gains are achieved.  
For the ASEAN-4 economies, the existing literature on the impacts of China’s trade is mixed, with 
some studies showing positive effects and others showing negative or ambiguous effects. The 
ASEAN-4 economies, circa 1995, tended to be less open and less integrated with China. Moreover, 
its pattern of trade is less complementary with China than the more developed Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, we find that the ASEAN-4 economies also experience gains in the order of 7 to 8% of 
GDP, from a decade of China’s growth. The gains are smaller than those of Japan and the NIEs, for 
the reasons cited, but are, nevertheless, also large. 
The income gains are long run steady state results, and hence incorporate increased incomes from 
capital deepening. Nevertheless, the income gains for the developed Asian and ASEAN-4 
economies are far larger than typical models would predict from complete trade liberalization or 
similar tax reforms. The overall conclusion for these countries is that growth rates over the last 
several decades would have substantially smaller in the absence of China’s growth.  
The sources of this growth are the terms of trade improvements. The Asian economies benefit from 
higher export prices to the Chinese market. Moreover, the lower relative import prices, particularly 
from imports of Chinese durable goods, induce substantial accumulation of machinery and 
equipment capital. Such gains do not come without significant economywide adjustments and the 
results also point to large crowding out effects in durables manufacturing, under competition from 
the rapidly growing Chinese durables export sector. In the short run, the adjustment costs could be 
large. These adjustments are necessary for the gains to be realised. The results suggest that 
protectionist policies, or policies that offset the changes in industry composition will limit the 
potential long run benefits from China’s growth miracle.   14
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Table 1: Shares of Merchandise Exports in China 






Agriculture    0.14 0.09 0.03 
Minerals  0.10 0.04 0.03 
Low-tech  Manufacturing  0.36 0.37 0.24 
Intermediate  Manufacturing  0.14 0.17 0.14 
Durables  0.26 0.33 0.56 
Source: Comtrade.   18
 
Table 2: Regional Export Shares in 1995 
  
Exports to China  
(% Total Exports) 
Chinese Exports to 
Region  
(% China’s Exports) 
Imports From China   
(% Total Imports) 
  
Developed 
Asia  ASEAN-4  Developed 
Asia  ASEAN-4  Developed 
Asia  ASEAN-4 
Agriculture  0.1  0.6  3.4  0.5  0.9  0.4 
Minerals  0.4  0.3  1.5  0.1  0.4  0.1 
Low-tech Manufacturing.  2.0  0.8  11.3  0.6  3.1  0.5 
Intermediate Manufacturing  3.0  0.7  4.8  1.0  1.3  0.9 
Durables  4.8  0.7  8.6  1.6  2.4  1.5 
Traded Services  0.3  0.4  1.3  0.5  0.3  0.5 
Total  10.6  3.5  31.0  4.2  8.4  3.9 
Source: GTAP Data Base Export Values 1995. Note: ‘Imports from’ are measured as exports from China to 
developed Asia and ASEAN as a fraction of world exports to these regions, including intra-regional and 
international trade.  
   19
 
Table 3: Sectoral Export Shares of China, Developed Asia and ASEAN-4 (%) 
 China  Developed 
Asia  ASEAN-4 
Export Shares in 1990     
Agriculture 13.2  3.2  14.8 
Minerals 8.9  2.7  18.5 
Low-tech Manufacturing  32.7  15.6  20.7 
Intermediate Manufacturing  12.6  11.1  9.1 
Durables 23.8  53.4  20.9 
Traded Services  8.8  14.0  16.1 
      
Export Shares in 2005     
Agriculture 3.2  0.8  8.3 
Minerals 2.4  3.0  12.5 
Low-tech Manufacturing  22.0  5.8  11.3 
Intermediate Manufacturing  12.7  13.3  11.2 
Durables 50.7  58.8  43.4 
Traded Services  8.9  18.3  13.3 
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Table 4: Alternative Historic Growth Scenarios for China 











     
Real GDP per capita  80.8 80.8 80.8 
Exports relative to GDP  -25.3  59.1 59.1 
Real Skilled Wages  57.1  35.8  35.8 
Real Unskilled Wages  86.5  51.9  52.6 
Real Consumption per worker  76.4  81.1  77.9 
Machinery and Equipment  76.0  103.3  104.6 
Structures 84.2  76.0  81.9 
Residential Capital  87.1  89.4  85.3 
Skilled Labour  21.8  29.0  31.5 
Unskilled labour  -1.3  -1.8  -1.9 
Tertiary Enrolments  21.8  29.0  31.5 
Terms-of-Trade -9.8  -32.5  -31.3 
Real Exchange Rate (Traded /Non-traded)  -0.3  -3.5  -3.9 
Inverse Trade Costs Index  0.0  73.2  64.0 
Labour Productivity Index  102.3  30.2  31.9 
      
Industry Outputs       
Agriculture 77.4  12.4  3.1 
Minerals 100.1  -19.0  58.1 
Low-tech Manufacturing  75.7  48.8  34.8 
Intermediate Manufacturing  96.6  62.7  70.6 
Durables 93.3  143.7  147.0 
Traded Services  104.1  92.2  96.0 
Construction 85.8  76.2  79.9 
Non-traded Services  86.3  72.4  74.4 
Public 92.4  69.3  71.6 
House 80.0  81.8  79.3 
Education 21.8  29.0  31.5 
      
Trade Shares (%)       
Agriculture 4.6  3.2  3.2 
Minerals 2.4  2.4  2.4 
Low-tech Manufacturing  28.3  22.0  22.0 
Intermediate Manufacturing  15.5  12.7  12.7 
Durables   37.7  50.7  50.7 
Traded Services   11.4  8.9  8.9 
      
Note: Numbers in italics are the target values and are determined by calibrated changes in productivity 
and trade costs parameters in the simulation.     21
 
Table 5: Long Run Effects of China’s Growth on Developed Asia 
  Unbiased 
Growth 
          s1 
Trade Sector 
Biased 
Growth       







     
Real GDP per capita  1.6  16.2  12.6 
Exports relative to GDP  3.4  8.1  10.3 
Real Skilled Wages  1.1  10.0  9.3 
Real Unskilled Wages  1.2  10.6  9.9 
Real Consumption per worker  1.4  13.1  11.0 
Machinery and Equipment  3.1  29.2  27.0 
Structures 2.0  29.4  15.0 
Residential Capital  1.3  13.0  10.8 
Skilled Labour  0.2  0.0  -0.8 
Unskilled labour  -0.1  0.0  0.3 
Tertiary Enrolments  0.2  0.0  -0.8 
Terms of Trade  1.1  7.5  6.9 
Real Exchange Rate (Traded /Non-traded)  -0.8  -6.3  -6.0 
      
Industry Outputs       
Agriculture -1.5  6.5  9.5 
Minerals 23.8  590.1  19.6 
Low-tech Manufacturing  -2.5  99.3  180.4 
Intermediate Manufacturing  0.5  26.0  15.7 
Durables 2.7  -61.8  -57.1 
Traded Services  0.3  12.7  5.4 
Construction 1.6  22.6  13.4 
Non-traded Services  1.4  15.9  9.1 
Public 1.1  6.6  2.3 
House 1.3  12.8  10.5 
Education 0.2  0.0  4.4 
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Table 6: Changes in Export Shares for Developed Asia 
  
Base Values 1995 
Trade Shares with 
Unbiased Growth in 
China 
Trade Shares with 
Biased Growth In 
China 
Trade Shares with 
Biased growth and 
Tariff Reform 
   China  ROW  China  ROW  China  ROW  China  ROW 
Agriculture  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.6  0.8  0.4  0.8  0.4 
Minerals  0.5  0.8  0.8  0.9  10.0  4.4  10.8  4.6 
Low Tech Manu.  2.5  5.0  3.5  4.5  21.0  8.8  17.3  7.2 
Int. Manu.  3.6  10.1  4.8  9.4  13.6  8.7  15.6  9.2 
Durables  5.9  53.8  8.6  50.8  4.8  13.0  5.6  14.3 
Traded Services  0.4  16.6  0.4  15.6  0.6  13.8  0.6  13.6 
Total  13.0  87.0  18.3  81.7  50.8  49.2  50.7  49.3 
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Table 7: Long Run Effects of China’s Growth on ASEAN-4 













     
Real GDP per capita  0.6  7.7  7.3 
Exports relative to GDP  1.0  -1.8  -1.7 
Real Skilled Wages  0.3  4.0  3.7 
Real Unskilled Wages  0.4  5.4  5.1 
Real Consumption per worker  0.5  6.7  6.3 
Machinery and Equipment  1.0  14.3  13.7 
Structures 0.6  9.6  9.0 
Residential Capital  0.6  7.5  7.0 
Skilled Labour  -0.1  -0.3  -0.2 
Unskilled labour  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Tertiary Enrolments  -0.1  -0.3  -0.2 
Terms of Trade  0.3  2.8  2.7 
Real Exchange Rate (Traded /Non-traded)  -0.1  -1.5  -1.4 
      
Industry Outputs       
Agriculture 0.6  14.6  13.3 
Minerals 0.4  6.8  6.4 
Low-tech Manufacturing  1.9  35.4  36.3 
Intermediate Manufacturing  -0.8  6.4  5.4 
Durables 1.3  -37.8  -36.0 
Traded Services  -0.9  1.0  1.0 
Construction 0.5  8.5  8.0 
Non-traded Services  0.5  5.3  5.1 
Public 0.3  5.4  5.1 
House 0.5  6.4  6.0 
Education -0.1  -0.3  -0.2 
      
 
 
   24
Table 8: Changes in Export Shares for ASEAN-4 
  
Base Values 1995 
Trade Shares with 
Unbiased Growth in 
China 
Trade Shares with 
Biased Growth In 
China 
Trade Shares with 
Biased growth and 
Tariff Reform 
   China  ROW  China  ROW  China  ROW  China  ROW 
Agriculture  0.7  8.2  1.1  8.0  7.8  7.2  7.1  7.3 
Minerals  0.4  7.0  0.5  6.8  1.7  6.3  1.6  6.3 
Low Tech Manu.  0.8  14.4  1.3  14.3  5.6  17.7  5.6  17.9 
Int. Manu.  0.8  9.0  1.0  8.7  3.7  8.5  3.4  8.5 
Durables  0.7  39.9  1.1  39.4  1.4  22.9  1.4  23.7 
Traded Services  0.4  17.8  0.4  17.3  0.7  16.4  0.6  16.5 
Total  3.7  96.3  5.5  94.5  20.9  79.1  19.8  80.2   25
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